There is something about the AI moment that reminds me a lot of when the internet was new. A lot of what was imagined and promised about the internet was never realized. But much was.
I’ve been reading Ellen Ullman’s memoirs - “Life in Code” and “Close to the Machine” - and her observations about proximity to technology feel relevant here. Being close to the machine means understanding its actual capabilities and limitations apart from the prevailing sales narratives. It also means a kind of loneliness, because you are working in a space that others don’t yet see clearly or fully understand.
I suspect people thinking seriously about AI right now will experience something similar: a stretch of hostility and discomfort while the rest of the world catches up and the consumer market level-sets on the promises being made. In the interim, the hype will not match the reality, and the reality will sometimes exceed the hype in ways no one predicted. And for a while, how it works and why it matters won’t be legible to everyone at once.
“Evidence from a study about workplace writers who use AI suggests that writers are outsourcing some of their research, editing, or drafting to AI, but that they retain responsibility for their writing.”
The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power.
This was my era in college, and I remember feeling challenged and overwhelmed as an undergrad trying to read theory for the first time. So today, I asked Claude.ai to put it in plain language, just to see what would happen. Here’s the after:
Scholars used to think that capitalism shaped society in consistent, predictable patterns. But newer thinking focuses on how power works—how it repeats, overlaps, and gets reshaped over time. This brought time into the picture and moved away from older theories that treated social structures as fixed. Instead, recognizing that structures can change opened up a new way of understanding power: it's tied to specific moments and strategies, and it's always being renegotiated.
A lot of readers are fascinated with the “black box” of AI writing, and trying to reverse engineer what it does and why. John Gallagher goes down the rabbit hole and articulates some credible theories about why LLMs use lists and listing to create meaning, and why it matters.
French overlooks how smartphones and social media raised the stakes on debate and discussion, transforming campus discourse. Today’s students worry that one viral misstep (in countless directions) may define them forever.
Tiktok is not much better or worse than other major social platforms, I say. The primary arguments against TikTok, including data collection, algorithmic manipulation, potential foreign government access, addiction and influence on public opinion, apply with equal or greater force to American platforms. Meta has faced billions in fines for allowing privacy violations, enabled documented election interference, and its algorithms have been linked to mental health harms and the amplification of extremist content globally, including perpetuating a genocide in Myanmar. Google and other domestic platforms vacuum up vastly more user data with fewer restrictions.
The distinguishing factor isn’t the behavior but the ownership: TikTok’s parent company ByteDance is subject to Chinese law and intelligence relationships, while Meta and Google are subject to U.S. law and intelligence relationships. That’s a legitimate policy distinction, but rarely articulated honestly. Instead, the debate has been framed around purportedly unacceptable harms that American tech companies perpetrate routinely, creating a kind of security theater that lets domestic platforms escape equivalent scrutiny while positioning a foreign competitor for a forced sale or ban.
The TikTok deal means American users will see a US-only algorithm. Brands and creators will likely see smaller audiences and higher costs for domestic reach. ByteDance faces split algorithms, divided workforces and parallel governance, complicating product delivery across global markets.
The promise of AI is that it makes work more productive, but the reality is proving more complex and less rosy.
I’m generally skeptical of anyone selling a solution to a social problem that relies on individual abstinence, so I tend to be annoyed with many arguments about the attention economy. I more or less land here on the question of AI, which I know many of my contemporaries will find similarly annoying.
Searching for Suzy Thunder: In the ’80s, Susan Headley ran with the best of them—phone phreakers, social engineers, and the most notorious computer hackers of the era. Then she disappeared.
While conspiring with a friend about life and work in these trying times, both of us confessed that we believe, at the root, that reading and writing are ultimately the cure for everything that ails us: collectively, individually, epistemically, existentially. Maybe that’s naive, but I’ll take it.
If you spend time around cycling and pedestrian advocates, the debate between bans and regulations is familiar territory. When I got deep into road biking, where I learned to ride long distance through a red state with almost no bike infrastructure outside tight urban and exurban areas, one of the best things I did was take road classes through the League of American Bicyclists. You learn the rules of the road from a cyclist’s perspective and practice skills like riding with car traffic under expert guidance, including how to change a flat on the side of the road in the height of summer, gritty with sweat and road grime.
The challenge is that bike education isn’t standardized, so most cyclists never learn the fundamentals anyway. Many of us learned as kids and haven’t had a refresh since. I get stomach pain when I see people riding at night without a light, going too fast on a dedicated path, and adults riding their bike on a pedestrian sidewalk. But when I think about e-bike bans and pedestrian right-of-way debates, it strikes me that outside of getting a driver’s permit for car drivers, there’s essentially no infrastructure for learning how to share roads and paths safely. We’re trying to regulate behavior most of us didn’t learn in earnest.
UW-Madison is among universities seeing federal terminations of international student visas. Public research universities have come to rely on these students to offset funding cuts. The losses are both financial and cultural.
Wondering whether I want to switch to something more robust like Wordpress if I keep doing this thing, but at the same time I have enjoyed not working within and around the world of WP, which has dominated my CMS experience since the aughts.
“In short, decades of research have demonstrated that our political beliefs and behavior are thoroughly motivated and mediated by our social identities: i.e., the many cross-cutting social groupings we feel affinity with. And as long as we do not account for this profound and pervasive dependence, our attempts to address the epistemic failures threatening contemporary democracies will inevitably fall short. More than any particular institutional, technological, or educational reform, promoting a healthier democracy requires reshaping the social identity landscape that ultimately anchors other democratic pathologies.”
As always, this drives me back to Haraway’s cyborg, a useful metaphor for thinking about our political, environmental and social tangle and how it butts up against emerging tech and science. (In Haraway’s context, it was the rise of STEM as a driving force in academia at the dawn of the computer age.) Bagg’s argument lands in familiar territory for anyone who’s wrestled with the cyborg metaphor. Both reject the assumption that better information alone will save us from ourselves, whether from context collapse or the dualisms (binaries, heh) that structure how we think about technology, nature, humanity and politics.
Bagg arrives at something parallel from political science: We trust information that affirms the groups we belong to.
Business and marketing, for what it’s worth, tell us the same thing from a slightly different angle: you’re most likely to convert on a recommendation from a trusted friend.
The next best thing in our current digital media landscape: a trusted influencer you identify with, which is why TikTok increasingly feels like QVC.
The problem isn’t that people lack access to truth, it’s that they’ve lost affinity with the experts, institutions and collaborative practices that produce real expertise. We’re arguably in era so thick with marketing that we are locked into performing respectability and purity aesthetics as our primary approach to the world and one another, instead of prioritizing social health and good function.
Both perspectives point toward the same conclusion: you have to recognize shared affinities through the slow work of creating conditions where people want to trust each other across differences.
AI using Wikipedia reminds me of the FAQ on setting up a Little Free Library:
_I think someone is stealing books from my library and selling them, what do I do?_
Remember that the purpose of a Little Free Library is to share books—you can’t really steal from it._